CEO Duality, Family-Control and Goodwill Impairment

Abstract

Deterioration in performance may increase the likelihood of the recognition of goodwill impairment in firms. It is believed that the magnitude of discretion given in the new accounting standards FRS 136- Impairment of Assets gives managers an additional incentive to manage the perception of users of financial statements using the impairment of goodwill item, particularly during the transition period. This problem can be exacerbated when there is a high concentration of family ownership and when family owners have control over the management and Board of Directors at the same time. This paper argues that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman role duality, particularly in family-controlled firms, could enhance the effect of entrenchment and expropriation activities. This study uses a sample of 948 firm-years observations of public firms listed on Bursa Malaysia from years 2006 to 2008 to examine whether the combined effect of CEO duality and family-controlled firms is related to goodwill impairment. This study finds evidence that the combined effect of CEO duality and family-controlled firms have significant effect on the recognition of goodwill impairment.
Keywords: CEO Duality, Corporate Governance, Corporate Reporting, Family-Controlled Firms, Financial Accounting, Goodwill Impairment
JEL Classification: M41